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Central and eastern Europe (CEE) is the emerging mar-
ket region hardest hit by the spillovers of the financial 
crisis from the advanced economies so far. It has been 
affected so hard because it had financed its long expan-
sion to a great extent by foreign borrowing, and many 
countries, including Croatia, had accumulated large ex-
ternal and internal imbalances in the process. As exter-
nal sources of funding began to evaporate in the second 
half of 2008, it was only a question of time before pri-
vate consumption and investment in the region would 
start to adjust. The adjustment accelerated in late 2008 
and early 2009 as western European countries fell deep-
er into recession and sharply reduced their demand for 
imports from CEE. The public sector in many CEE coun-
tries largely ignored these events for several months, but 
eventually started to adjust as well. In particular, the 
public sector in Croatia postponed adjustment until the 
spring of 2008, unnecessarily bringing into question the 
maintenance of macroeconomic and financial stability. 
While some initial steps have been taken to remedy the 
situation, it remains to be seen how the revised budget 
for 2009 will be implemented and how the resulting def-
icit will be financed in a very difficult global financial 
environment. 
1 Introduction
The idea for this Newsletter first appeared in March 
2008, when the Croatian parliament adopted the budget 
for 2008 and the Institute of Public Finance published 
its first Press Release (Bajo, 2008). At the time, Croatia, 
like the rest of central and eastern Europe (CEE), was 
still spared the more serious spillovers from the finan-
cial turmoil in US and European financial markets. 
Growth was relatively strong and the main policy con-
cern was inflation, which accelerated sharply due to the 
pick-up in food and oil prices and tight labour markets. 
The budget for 2008 envisaged a reduction in the gener-
al government deficit to 2.3% of GDP from 2.6% in 2007. 
This gradual reduction was widely viewed as appropri-
ate. There were a few analysts advocating a sharper re-
duction (see in Pavić, 2008), but many commentators and 
politicians were also calling for an increase in the defi-
cit, arguing that the budget was not »developmental« 
enough (see in Varošanec, 2008). I was struck by the dis-
connect between such claims and the clear signs of tight-
ening in global financial markets, and suggested to the 
colleagues at the Institute of Public Finance a brief note 
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on this issue. My idea was to argue for a sharper deficit 
reduction on the grounds that this was both possible and 
more efficient: possible because the baseline scenario 
was one of an orderly slowdown in exports, domestic de-
mand and credit growth; and more efficient because it 
was better to consolidate public finances when the times 
were still good rather than later, when it would became 
more difficult and costlier to finance the deficit. 
However, just as the authorities procrastinated with fis-
cal adjustment, I did with the writing of this Newsletter. 
Three months after the original budget was approved, 
the government adopted a revised budget for 2008, based 
on a new methodology for recording government trans-
actions harmonised with EU standards (i.e. European 
System of Accounts, ESA 95). This made comparisons 
with budgets for previous years difficult, and allowed an 
increase in overall spending while keeping the reduction 
in the headline deficit unchanged at 0.3% of GDP. Name-
ly, according to the ESA 95 methodology the 2008 gen-
eral government deficit was projected at 1.3% of GDP, 
down from 1.6% of GDP estimated for 2007, even though 
the revised budget introduced higher spending on health 
care and new subsidies for households and businesses 
hit by food and energy price increases. 
During the second half of 2008, the budget was largely 
outside the media attention. Data indicated that revenue 
collection in the first half of the year was strong, which 
made it easier to quieten concerns expressed by some 
analysts over an unusual, 24% increase in subsidies and 
current and capital transfers (EIZG, 2008). Moreover, 
the baseline scenario of an orderly slowdown in emerg-
ing markets played out fairly closely through September 
2008. This further reduced the urgency for me to com-
plete this newsletter. 
But starting in October 2008 the CEE region got increas-
ingly sucked into the global financial and econom-
ic maelstrom. As credit markets around the globe be-
came dysfunctional in the aftermath of the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, there was heavy and at times indis-
criminate selling of emerging market assets.2 CEE was 
hit particularly hard because it had financed its long ex-
pansion to a great extent by foreign borrowing. 
This time the financial market tremors started affecting 
fiscal outcomes and policy in Croatia fairly quickly. Data 
for the third quarter indicated a sharp slowdown in rev-
enue collection (from 8.1% in the second quarter, to 2.4% 
in the third). However, general government expenditure 
remained strong, growing 8% year-on-year in the third 
quarter (compared with 6.8% in the second quarter). The 
finance ministry resorted to very frequent and large 
T-bill issuances in the last quarter of 2008 and January 
2009, suggesting that it started to face liquidity problems 
(EIZG, 2009b).
Against this background, the government initially pro-
posed to reduce the budget deficit for 2009 to zero. How-
ever, the debate on this proposal turned out to be more 
intense than expected, involving social and coalition 
partners, economists, and government and parliament 
members. The most controversial topics were the public 
sector wage increase and the health system reform (Ott, 
2008). The public sector trade unions opposed vehement-
ly any limitation of the previously agreed 6% wage in-
crease. And as in 2008, many commentators and politi-
cians were still advocating an increase in the budget def-
icit (Šajatović, 2008), despite the clear signs that the cri-
sis had worsened. The arguments ranged from oversim-
plified Keynesian thinking to naïve imitation (»All ad-
vanced economies are doing it«). In the end, the govern-
ment decided not to break the collective agreement with 
the public sector trade unions for the sake of »social 
peace«. The 2009 budget thus envisaged a general gov-
ernment deficit of 1.2% of GDP, with both revenue and 
expenditure projected to increase by 5.2%. 
But the criticism of yet another postponement of fiscal 
adjustment did not subside. Nor did real economy and 
financial market prospects get any better. On the contra-
ry, in January and February 2009 it became clear that 
the state of the real economy was deteriorating much 
faster than anyone had anticipated, and that many bor-
rowers, including governments, might run into difficul-
ties with repaying or rolling over their debt. In mid-Feb-
ruary, financial markets in the CEE region were close to 
a panic mood. The long-standing vulnerabilities were 
suddenly exposed in a much grimmer light than at any 
time since the Russian crisis of 1998. 
At that point, the Croatian authorities seem to have fi-
nally acknowledged what some analysts have been ar-
guing all along – that either expenditure needs to be cut 
or taxes increased (Ott, 2009; EIZG, 2009a). According-
ly, they started to revise the 2009 budget and in late 
March sent a draft of the revisions to the parliament. The 
draft revised budget envisages 6.4% lower revenue and 
4.3% lower expenditure compared to the budget adopt-
ed in December 2008. At this writing it is not possible 
to assess how the revised budget, that will eventually be 
adopted by the parliament, will look like. In any event, 
the details of revenue and expenditure adjustments are 
2  Investment bank Lehman Brothers was one of the most important counterparties on global swap and derivatives markets, which are essential for normal 
functioning of traditional securities markets. Its default therefore triggered major disruptions in global financial markets. 
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not the focus of this Newsletter; instead, it looks at two 
important issues that have not yet been thoroughly ana-
lysed in recent policy discussions: first, the scope for ex-
ternal financing of the budget deficit; and second, the 
scope for expansionary fiscal policies. Section 2 sets the 
scene with an overview of the latest financial market 
develop ments. Section 3 assesses recent developments 
and outlook for capital flows and external balances. Sec-
tion 4 concludes with a discussion of the monetary and 
fiscal policy mix, and the macroeconomic and financial 
risks of a possible fiscal expansion. 
2  The spread of the crisis to central and 
eastern Europe 
The crisis in the main financial centres that began in Au-
gust 2007 had for over a year only a moderate impact on 
CEE. Since October 2008, however, CEE has become one 
Graph 1 Equity prices  a
a January 2005 = 100; in local currency terms.
Source: Datastream.
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of the most affected emerging market regions. The crisis 
has spread in a rapid succession through equity, bond, 
foreign exchange and interbank markets, leading to a sig-
nificant tightening of external financing conditions and 
a large-scale withdrawal of cross-border loans. 
The first to feel the full force of the crisis were the eq-
uity markets. The slide in equity prices that began in 
different markets in mid- or late 2007, and continued at 
a more or less gradual pace through August 2008, turned 
into a veritable plunge in September and October, when 
prices fell by 50% on average, and by close to 60% in 
Croatia (Graph 1, right-hand panel). By mid-February 
2009, CEE equities have on average lost 75% from peak 
values realised in 2007, and were back to the levels from 
2004 or earlier. It is worth noting that Croatia had expe-
rienced the greatest increase in equity prices of all CEE 
countries: between January 2005 and mid-October 2007, 
equity prices in Croatia appreciated by 316% (Graph 1, 
Graph 2 Bond spreads for selected countries  a
a  Spreads over benchmark euro area bonds, in basis points. b For Latvia, 5-year bond; for Lithuania, 4-year bond; for Macedonia,  
6-year bond.
Sources: Datastream; JPMorgan Chase.
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right-hand panel), compared to the average of 230% for 
other countries in the region.
The next domino that fell was the CEE sovereign eu-
robond market. After the onset of the crisis in August 
2007, spreads of widely traded central European sover-
eign bonds at first moved up gradually, from around 
30-45 basis points, to 50-100 basis points in September 
2008 (Graph 2, left-hand panel). In south-eastern Europe 
and the Baltics, the spreads had widened by an addition-
al 50-100 basis points over this period, reflecting great-
er concerns over external financing (Graph 2, centre and 
right-hand panels). 
However, the worsening of the crisis in September and 
October 2008 led to unexpectedly sharp widening of bond 
spreads. In particular, for countries with larger external 
3  By the end of April, the Croatian CDS spreads dropped back to around 300 points, as a measure of calm returned to CEE markets. However, 300 points is 
still a heavy insurance premium: an investor buying $10 million worth of Croatian government bonds needs to pay $300,000 to insure against the risk of 
default on these bonds.
imbalances, the spreads jumped in parallel with escalat-
ing problems on the Hungarian forint market (see below), 
in the case of Croatia, from 100 basis points in early Sep-
tember, to 550 points at the end of December (Graph 2, 
left-hand panel). In credit insurance markets, credit de-
fault swap spreads for sovereign bonds of highly indebt-
ed countries such as Croatia, Hungary, Romania and Tur-
key soared within days, in the case of Croatia from 100 
to 450 basis points initially, and close to 600 points in 
early March 2009 (Graph 3, right-hand panel).3 
The turmoil in October quickly spread to the foreign ex-
change markets. The collapse of Icelandic banks led to 
a dramatic drop in the equity price of Hungary’s OTP 
bank (which was viewed as vulnerable because it is not 
majority foreign-owned) and a collapse in foreign de-
Graph 3 CDS spreads  a
a Senior five-year CDS mid spread, in euros. Five-day moving averages; in basis points. 
Source: Datastream.
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a  December 2006 = 100; euro per unit of local currency (nominal effective exchange rates for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). 
An increase indicates an appreciation; monthly averages.
Sources: ECB; Datastream; national data; BIS.
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mand for forint-denominated government bonds. As 
banks were no longer prepared to exchange euros for for-
ints in foreign currency swap markets, the forint depre-
ciated sharply, triggering contagion effects throughout 
the region (Graph 4).4 The Polish zloty, for instance, de-
preciated by over 20% against the euro over the fourth 
quarter of 2008 (left-hand panel). 
Household and corporate borrowers with large foreign 
exchange exposures suffered losses as local currencies 
fell against the euro, the Swiss franc and the dollar. Many 
investors with maturing foreign currency debt were 
forced to raise foreign exchange by selling local curren-
cy assets at much depreciated prices, magnifying the de-
cline in exchange rates and equity prices in very thin 
markets. Liquidity was drained from the interbank mar-
kets as well, with money market rates spiking occasion-
ally at 40% in Croatia and Romania. 
Several central banks responded by lending euros to 
their banks. The ECB provided euro refinancing (aga-
inst high-quality collateral) to Hungary and Poland, and 
the Swiss National Bank extended Swiss franc/euro 
swap arrangements to Hungary and Poland. The Croatian 
National Bank intervened directly in the foreign ex-
change market and released foreign exchange liquidity 
by repealing the marginal and lowering the minimum 
reserve requirement on foreign borrowing by banks. As 
a result, the kuna depreciated vis-à-vis the euro by only 
about 4% between end-September 2008 and end-Janu-
ary 2009. 
4  In foreign currency swap markets two parties, usually banks, exchange surplus foreign currencies for a certain length of time, at fixed or floating interest 
rates, and agree to reverse the transaction at a later date. 
5 See eg. http://www.cnb.cz/en/public/media_service/press_releases_cnb/2009/090224_statement_FT.html
The latest storm that hit the CEE markets started on 17 
February, when the rating agency Moody’s (2009) warned 
that it might downgrade banks active in CEE because of 
their heavy exposure to the region. Although the report 
revealed no new information about the vulnerabilities of 
parent banks or their subsidiaries, it shook investor con-
fidence. Equity prices plunged by more than 10% on av-
erage within a week (Graph 1); bond spreads soared to 
300 basis points in Poland and 500 points in Croatia and 
Hungary (Graph 2); currencies came under renewed pres-
sure (Graph 4); and parent banks’ CDS spreads rose 
sharply. Taken together, these developments have led to 
widespread concerns about the imminent onset of a fi-
nancial crisis in the region.
As it turned out, the Moody’s report and the subsequent 
reporting in the press (especially the Financial Times 
and the Economist) contained errors that may have in-
fluenced market decisions. In particular, figures on for-
eign bank lending were misreported by including not 
only cross-border loans from parent banks to their sub-
sidiaries in CEE, but also loans that the subsidiaries 
granted on the basis of deposits in domestic and foreign 
currencies raised from their local customers in CEE. This 
prompted central banks of the Czech Republic, Hunga-
ry, Poland and Romania to coordinate the issuance of 
press statements informing the markets about the actual 
state of foreign bank lending in their countries.5 On 23 
February, the rating agency Standard and Poor’s (2009) 
issued a report that introduced somewhat greater differ-
Graph 5 Yield of Croatian Government eurobonds (Euro EMBI Global HR) in percentage points
Source: JP Morgan.
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
24 Oct 2008
8.19
30 Apr 2009
6.12
21 Sep 2005
3.06
1/
5/
20
00
1/
5/
20
01
1/
5/
20
02
1/
5/
20
03
1/
5/
20
04
1/
5/
20
05
1/
5/
20
06
1/
5/
20
07
1/
5/
20
08
1/
5/
20
09
1/
11
/2
00
0
1/
11
/2
00
1
1/
11
/2
00
2
1/
11
/2
00
3
1/
11
/2
00
4
1/
11
/2
00
5
1/
11
/2
00
6
1/
11
/2
00
7
1/
11
/2
00
8
The financial turmoil in central and eastern Europe and fiscal policy in Croatia
6
entiation among the countries in the region. Around the 
same time, the Austrian National Bank clarified several 
key arguments behind its pan-European initiative 
launched in late January, which was aimed at assisting 
the CEE countries to avoid a crisis (OeNB, 2009).
In summary, financial markets in CEE and Croatia have 
been hit very hard by the global financial crisis. Coun-
tries with large current account deficits and large cur-
rency or maturity mismatches in their private sector bal-
ance sheets are experiencing significant pressure on their 
currencies and sharply higher cost of external finance. 
In Croatia, the risk premium on external borrowing for 
the government (measured by the index of widely trad-
ed emerging market bonds Euro EMBI Global) increased 
roughly five times since the middle of 2008, and 20 times 
since the middle of 2007 (Graph 2). The cost of external 
borrowing, measured by the yield on sovereign bonds 
(i.e. the rate of return that market investors require to 
hold Croatian government debt) increased from 3% in 
September 2005 to 6% in April 2009 (Graph 5). Togeth-
er with fears of the impact on their banking systems, 
these concerns have already led Hungary, Latvia, Ser-
bia, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine to seek IMF assist-
ance. At present it is not clear whether actions taken by 
the CEE countries’ authorities and external assistance 
will prevent the spread of a CEE-specific turmoil on top 
of the global crisis.
3 Capital flows and external balances
Since late 2008, the financial crisis has also spread to 
the real economy. The April 2009 consensus forecast 
for central and eastern Europe indicates that GDP in the 
region as a whole is expected to decline by -3.2% in 2009, 
and in Croatia by -2.9% (Consensus Economics, 2009). 
By comparison, in December 2008 the consensus fore-
cast for growth in Croatia in 2009 was 1.8%. The dete-
rioration in the real sector that is currently underway will 
no doubt deepen in the coming months and have severe 
second-round effects on banks. This will be another se-
rious test for financial stability in Croatia as well as 
CEE.
In addition to the sharp fall in external demand and out-
put, prospects for a sharp and disruptive fall in the avail-
ability of capital flows resurfaced in February 2009 as 
one of the main risks to the region’s economic outlook. 
The growth of international bank credit to CEE ini-
tially held up remarkably well: in the first half of 2008, 
when loans to other emerging markets had already start-
ed to contract, the external loans of BIS reporting banks 
vis-à-vis the non-bank private sector in CEE were equiv-
alent to 75% of the total for 2007 (55% in the case of 
loans to the banks) (Appendix Tables A1 and A2).6 
But during the third quarter of 2008, the BIS reporting 
banks withdrew loans from banks in all CEE countries 
with the exception of Bulgaria, Lithuania and Turkey 
(Appendix Table A1). Similarly, there was a net outflow 
to the BIS reporting banks from the non-bank private 
sector in all CEE countries with the exception of Hun-
gary, Romania, Serbia and Slovakia (Appendix Table 
A2). The reversal was not restricted to the countries with 
large current account deficits and significant currency 
or maturity mismatches in their balance sheets. Some of 
the largest outflows took place from banks in the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Slovakia, suggesting that some par-
ent banks may have resorted to internal borrowings from 
their CEE affiliates in an effort to deleverage and to liq-
uefy their balance sheets. 
In Croatia, central bank’s prudential measures managed 
to restrict the growth of cross-border loans to banks al-
most completely in 2007 (Appendix Table A1), but cor-
porations resorted to direct borrowing from abroad, in-
creasing their external debt by $6.6 billion (Appendix 
Table A2). In the first quarter of 2008, gross external 
loans surged both to banks (by $2 billion) and to the non-
bank private sector (by $2.3 billion). However, cross-bor-
der loans to banks started to reverse already in the sec-
ond quarter and the outflow accelerated in the third quar-
ter (by $2.5 billion). Cross-border loans to the non-bank 
private sector were still positive in the second quarter 
but reversed as well in the third quarter. Surprisingly, in 
the fourth quarter of 2008 cross-border loans to banks 
in Croatia increases by $2 billion, and to non-banks by 
$0.4 billion. Croatia was similar in this respect to other 
smaller economies in the region. By contrast, in larger 
CEE economies such as the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Russia and Turkey, cross-border loans decreased signif-
icantly in the fourth quarter. However, data for the first 
quarter of 2009 will probably indicate a decrease in 
cross-border loans in Croatia and other smaller CEE 
economies because of the deepening of the crisis.7 
Data on international bond issuance and syndicated 
loans depict the same picture. After record-high issuance 
6  Bank for International Settlements (BIS) collects and disseminates since 1964 data on international banking transactions. Quarterly reports on transactions 
are submitted by banks from 41 advanced economies, and they cover over 90% of total international banking transactions. For more information see www.
bis.org/statistics.
7 The BIS international banking data for Q4 2008 were released at the end of April 2009; data for Q1 2009 will be released in early July 2009.
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of international debt securities in 2007 and the first half 
of 2008 (a total of $15 billion and $10 billion, respective-
ly), net bond issuance in CEE fell in the second half of 
2008 to just $0.3 billion. In the first quarter of 2009 net 
international bond issuance increased slightly due to suc-
cessful placements of sovereign bonds by Poland and 
Turkey, albeit at much higher spreads than a year ago. 
Croatia made net repayments of maturing debt in both 
2008 and in the firts quarter of 2009 (by $1 billion and 
$0.7 billion, respectively). 
Syndicated lending to the region slowed already in the 
first half of 2008, to $17 billion (from $39 billion in 
2007), and fell further in the second half of the year (to 
$12 billion). In the first quarter of 2009, syndicated lend-
ing in CEE amounted to less than $3 billion, with Croatia 
accounting for $0.7 billion.
Compared with cross-border loans and debt flows, for-
eign direct investment flows are estimated to have held 
up relatively well last year. However, most of the inflows 
took place during the first half of the year. Recent data 
releases indicate that the inflows decelerated sharply in 
the third quarter. For instance, net FDI inflows to Croatia 
for the first three quarters of 2008 were over 20% lower 
than in the same period of 2007. The deceleration was 
particularly pronounced in the third quarter of 2008, with 
net inflows of just $170 million, compared with $1.1 bil-
lion in the first quarter. 
Meanwhile, despite indications of severe retrenchment 
of capital inflows, the balance of payments data sug-
gest that external current account deficit of Croatia in-
creased from -7.6% of GDP in 2007 to -9.4% in 2008. 
Projections of the deficit – and, hence, of external bor-
rowing requirements – for 2009 are highly uncertain at 
present because it is extremely difficult to estimate how 
deep and prolonged the downturn in external demand 
will be. An additional uncertainty is the extent of the 
downturn in household incomes and employment in the 
EU countries that traditionally provide most of the tour-
ists to Croatia. In any event, one can be fairly certain that 
the current account deficit will decline this year because 
more restricted and costlier external finance will lead to 
a decline in imports of goods and services. For instance, 
in its April Quarterly Outlook, the Economics Institute 
Zagreb (2009c) projects a decrease in the current account 
deficit to -4.7% of GDP. 
This deficit could still be difficult to finance in the cur-
rent circumstances. For instance, the external funding 
constraints forced Estonia to cut its current account def-
icit from close to 17% of GDP in the last quarter of 2007, 
to 6% in the last quarter of 2008. One should note in this 
context that Estonia has a much sounder government bal-
ance sheet than Croatia: during 2001-2008, the govern-
ment accumulated about 10% of GDP in reserves by con-
sistently running budget surpluses.
In summary, the reversal of large capital inflows, which 
have to a large extent financed the expansion in CEE and 
Croatia since 2002 (see Mihaljek, 2008), started during 
the summer of 2008 and has most likely accelerated in 
late 2008 and early 2009. It has affected not only coun-
tries with external and fiscal vulnerabilities such as 
Croatia, but also countries with sounder fundamentals 
such as the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. The 
external finance has become not only more expensive 
but also more scarce. These conditions are not likely to 
improve significantly over the next couple of years – the 
extremely favourable conditions that prevailed in global 
financial markets through 2007 may not be seen again 
for quite a while. Besides immediate problems with roll-
over of maturing foreign debt in 2009, this means that 
the entire Croatian economy – the corporate sector, 
banks, households as well as the public sector – faces the 
challenge of adjusting to a new pattern of growth that 
will have to be based primarily on domestic rather than 
foreign sources of saving (see Čičin-Šain, 2008).
4 Macroeconomic policy mix
The past few months have been one of the most chal-
lenging periods for macroeconomic policies since the 
start of the transition from socialist economic systems 
in 1989. Despite the rapid rise in inflationary pressures 
through much of 2008, fiscal policy in Croatia and other 
CEE countries generally continued to stimulate aggre-
gate demand, leaving the main responsibility for com-
bating inflation to central banks. At the same time, the 
disruptions in international credit markets, which mu-
tated into a full-scale global financial crisis in Septem-
ber 2008 and plunged the CEE markets into turmoil in 
February 2009, have initially forced central banks to pur-
sue the conflicting objectives of ensuring banking sys-
tem liquidity and addressing still strong inflationary 
pressures. Over the past two months, the policy focus 
has shifted again – this time in a matter of weeks – from 
softening the sharp fall in output toward preventing a fi-
nancial meltdown.
Monetary policy: adapting quickly  
to changing circumstances
Countries with inflation targeting strategies of monetary 
policy (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Serbia and Turkey) have generally been able to adapt 
more easily to changing macroeconomic circumstances 
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than those with fixed exchange rates (Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) or man-
aged exchange rate regimes (Croatia and Macedonia). 
This is partly because inflation targeting central banks, 
supported by well-defined institutional frameworks, have 
been able to react to rising inflationary pressures by in-
creasing short term nominal (and real) interest rates. 
Many of these countries consequently experienced sub-
stantial appreciation of their exchange rates through mid-
2008, which in turn helped contain imported inflation. 
In countries with fixed exchange rates the opportunities 
for raising interest rates – and the effects that such a 
move would have – were limited not only by exchange 
rate regimes but also by the high degree of currency sub-
stitution. As a result, the authorities had to deal with in-
flationary pressures indirectly, for instance, by trying to 
tackle the sources of inflation such as the rapid credit 
growth via prudential regulations. In Bulgaria and 
Croatia, central banks thus progressively tightened re-
serve requirements and other prudential regulations 
through the first half of 2008 in order to limit credit 
growth. More administrative measures, such as bank-
by-bank credit limits, were also used in some cases (e.g. 
in Croatia and Montenegro). 
Starting in October, the policy focus shifted from fight-
ing inflation to providing liquidity to domestic banking 
systems. The collapse of Lehman Brothers affected many 
parent banks with operations in CEE, forcing them to 
deleverage and liquefy their assets. As discussed in Sec-
tion 2, this had major repercussions for market liquidity 
in CEE, especially in those countries that are financial-
ly closely integrated with western Europe. As oil prices 
dropped sharply at the same time, removing one of the 
main threats to inflation, the inflation targeting central 
banks responded by cutting interest rates in a rapid suc-
cession of moves. 
In countries with fixed or tightly managed exchange 
rates, the policy response depended on the spillovers 
from the global markets on the domestic banking sys-
tems. Where banking sector stability was at risk, this be-
came a priority for monetary policy. For instance, banks 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia (and 
to a lesser extent Croatia) were adversely affected by a 
substantial withdrawal of foreign currency deposits dur-
ing the autumn of 2008. The central banks in these coun-
tries responded by lowering reserve requirements (in par-
ticular on foreign borrowing) to provide liquidity to the 
banks, and, together with the fiscal authorities, by in-
creasing deposit insurance limits. 
Where stability of the banking system was not an im-
mediate concern (e.g. in Bulgaria, Croatia and Lithua-
nia), central banks expanded repo operations, lowered 
the reserve requirements or loosened various prudential 
regulations on bank lending. The Croatian National 
Table 1 Selected fiscal indicators, 2007-2009  a (as a percentage of GDP)
General government balance Budget structure, 2008 Public debt, 2008b
2007 2008 2009 Revenue Expenditure
Czech Republic -0.6 -1.5 -4.3 40.9 42.4 29.8
Hungary -4.9 -3.4 -3.4 46.5 49.9 73.0
Poland -1.9 -3.9 -6.6 39.2 43.1 47.1
Slovakia -1.9 -2.2 -4.7 32.7 34.9 27.6
Slovenia 0.5 -0.9 -5.5 42.7 43.6 22.8
Estonia 2.7 -3.0 -3.0 37.9 40.9 4.8
Latvia -0.4 -4.0 -11.1 35.5 39.5 19.5
Lithuania -1.0 -3.2 -5.4 34.0 37.2 15.6
Bulgaria 0.1 1.5 -0.5 38.9 37.4 14.1
Croatia -1.6 -1.3 -1.4 45.0 46.3 35.6
Romania -2.5 -5.4 -5.1 33.1 38.5 15.2
Turkey -1.0 -2.1 -4.6 21.4 23.5 39.5
Albania -3.8 -5.2 -3.9 27.5 32.7 52.6
Bosnia and Herzegovina -0.1 -1.9 -3.1 47.8 49.7 34.3
Macedonia 0.6 -1.0 -3.5 35.6 36.6 21.4
Montenegro 6.4 1.5 -6.2 44.4 42.9 32.3
Serbia -1.9 -2.3 -1.8 42.0 45.2 33.8
Average -0.7 -2.3 -4.3 38.0 40.3 30.4
Euro area -0.6 -1.9 -5.3 44.7 46.6 69.3
a Official estimates and projections. For Croatia, EIZG (2009b; 2009c). bGross debt on a general government basis. 
Sources: European Commission, Spring 2009 Forecast, May 2009; IMF country reports; national data.
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Bank, for instance, abolished the marginal reserve re-
quirement on banks’ foreign borrowing in October in 
order to boost commercial banks’ liquidity; in Novem-
ber, it also reduced the reserve requirement rate by 3 per-
centage points in order to provide additional liquidity. 
In view of the sharp deterioration of the real sector out-
look, as late as mid-February most market analysts ex-
pected central banks to continue with rate cuts and other 
measures aimed at improving liquidity. However, mar-
ket turmoil unleashed by the Moody’s downgrade warn-
ing to parent banks with operations in CEE once again 
shifted the policy focus in several countries, this time to 
stabilising the exchange rates and preventing the onset 
of a full-blown financial crisis. The Czech National Bank 
announced a likely interest rate hike to prevent further 
slide of the koruna, and the Polish authorities, which have 
not intervened in foreign exchange markets for over a 
decade, sold some of the funds that Poland receives from 
the EU in order to boost the falling zloty. More govern-
ments announced the start or intensification of talks with 
the IMF on emergency loans, and central banks and gov-
ernments in several other countries called for co-ordi-
nated EU approach to help stabilise CEE markets. 
Fiscal policy: providing insufficient 
support to macroeconomic stabilisation
Like monetary policy, fiscal policy had to deal with sev-
eral rapidly moving targets over the past year. During 
the first half of 2008, when inflation was the main con-
cern, fiscal policy in most CEE countries, including 
Croatia, responded with greater spending instead of more 
restrictive measures (see Section 1). This was apparent-
ly done in the belief that the rise in inflation would be 
temporary, and would not affect wage expectations. In-
flation expectations, however, continued to rise. 
In the autumn of 2008, the focus of fiscal measures shift-
ed toward ensuring banking stability through an increase 
in guarantees on bank deposits. The end result was that 
fiscal performance deteriorated in almost all CEE coun-
tries in 2008 (Table 1). Only Hungary and Bulgaria im-
proved their fiscal positions substantially last year. While 
Croatia reduced its fiscal deficit marginally last year, one 
should note that it still has one of the highest revenue and 
expenditure shares in the region (45% and 46% of GDP, 
respectively), comparable only to those of Hungary, Bos-
nia and Herzegovina and Montenegro.
Further challenges arose in late 2008 and early 2009 
amid growing demands for fiscal stimulus packages. As 
noted above, partly in response to the packages an-
nounced by western European governments, some op-
position politicians and special interest groups have ar-
gued that the Croatian authorities should put in place 
their own programmes of assistance for selected sectors 
of the economy or for public infrastructure development. 
Other CEE countries have not been immune to such de-
mands, either. According to the latest European Com-
mission (2009) forecast, budget deficits will increase in 
2009 by 2% of GDP on average, and by up to 7 -8% in 
Latvia and Montenegro (Table 1). In the Czech Repub-
lic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia budget deficits will 
increase by 2½-4½% GDP, partly as a result of the pla-
nned expansion in public spending. Possible fiscal poli-
cy responses to the latest bout of instability that swept 
through financial markets in February 2009 have yet to 
be announced.
Graph 6 Long term interest rates  a
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a  Long-term domestic currency government bonds; the horizontal line refers to the 10-year German benchmark bond; end-of-period  
observations; in percentage. 
Sources: Datastream; ECB; national data.
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How the higher budget deficits in the region will be fi-
nanced remains unclear. The high degree of uncertain-
ty about the ability of governments in CEE to secure 
funding is partly reflected in the sharp increase in long-
term interest rates and market prices for protecting 
against defaults (i.e. CDS spreads) (Graph 6). Not sur-
prisingly, long-term rates have increased particularly 
sharply for the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Croatia and Hun-
gary, the »usual suspects« when it comes to external vul-
nerabilities in the region. It is also unsurprising that sov-
ereign credit ratings of the Baltic states and Hungary (as 
well as those of Croatia, for domestic currency debt) have 
been lowered since October 2008.
In summary, fiscal policy in Croatia, as well as elsewhere 
in the region, has provided only limited support to mon-
etary policy in the current challenging environment. In 
the period ahead, fiscal policy should provide support to 
monetary policy by focusing on consolidation rather than 
expansion. The scope to stimulate the economy through 
fiscal expansion in countries such as Croatia is limited 
first and foremost by foreign and domestic investors’ 
perception about CEE countries’ fiscal solvency. This 
perception has taken a severe hit in the latest round of 
crisis, and is not likely to recover soon. But, as discussed 
in the next section, even in the absence of financing con-
straints fiscal expansion is associated with some major 
implementation risks.
What are the risks from fiscal 
expansion? 
In the face of the deepest recession in decades, with mon-
etary policy reaching the limits of feasible, governments 
of many large countries started to launch fiscal stimu-
lus packages to boost output and fight rising unemploy-
ment. The fiscal stimulus in Europe is estimated at al-
most 3% of GDP this year (Saha and von Weizsäcker, 
2009). IMF (2008) expects that the tax cuts and increased 
spending in 2009 will cost around 1.5% GDP globally. 
The fiscal expansion represents a significant departure 
from the former broad consensus against discretionary 
fiscal policies. According to this view, fiscal policy 
should support the economy during a slowdown solely 
through the operation of automatic stabilisers, provided 
that the underlying fiscal position was sound. During a 
slowdown the fiscal deficit would rise automatically due 
to decreasing tax revenues and rising social security 
transfers. The scale and strength of automatic stabilisers 
varies between countries and depends primarily on the 
progressivity of the tax system and responsiveness of so-
cial security benefits to GDP growth. According to 
OECD (2008), the cyclical component of the budget def-
icit – i.e. non-discretionary fluctuations of revenue and 
expenditure over the business cycle – for euro area coun-
tries would increase by about 1% of GDP in 2009. Au-
tomatic stabilisers should therefore provide an important 
contribution to sustaining aggregate demand in the econ-
omy. But at the same time, they will result in a severe 
deterioration of fiscal positions of euro area countries. 
The consensus view also held that the use of large-scale 
discretionary fiscal stimuli should be confined only to 
exceptionally severe recessions. The current crisis no 
doubt meets this definition: the channels of monetary 
policy transmission have become ineffective in many 
countries, so there seems to be a need for another tool to 
boost output and protect against even deeper and longer 
recession. However, governments considering fiscal ex-
pansion should bear in mind the possible short-term and 
long-term risks of such measures. 
Sustainability risks. With any fiscal expansion, there 
is a potential threat to long-term sustainability of public 
finances. A lot depends on the initial state of public fi-
nances and sustainability concerns present before the 
onset of the crisis. In many European countries, includ-
ing Croatia, such concerns are clearly relevant, given the 
history of high budget deficits and high public debt. Op-
erations conducted by many governments to rescue trou-
bled financial institutions will also increase the stock of 
public debt. Finally, a major fiscal sustainability con-
straint is the impact of the ageing of the population on 
pensions and healthcare spending.
The current crisis has revealed that the fiscal sustaina-
bility outlook of many countries is much worse than pre-
viously thought. Countries that have enjoyed very strong 
growth and fiscal surpluses in recent years, such as Ire-
land, Spain and Latvia, are now experiencing very se-
vere recessions, leading to a dramatic reassessment of 
their growth prospects and, as a result, their fiscal sus-
tainability. For instance, Spain’s AAA long-term sover-
eign debt rating was lowered by S&P to AA+ in January 
2009. For Latvia, the rating was already downgraded 
three times between October 2008 and February 2009. 
One common feature of these countries and Croatia is 
that their economic expansion and growth of budget rev-
enues have relied to a great extent on construction and 
real estate sectors, which are currently experiencing a 
severe downturn. Past experience suggests that down-
turns in the construction sector tend to be protracted and 
severe: following the building boom spurred by reunifi-
cation in the early 1990s, output and employment in the 
German construction sector were declining for ten years 
(between 1994 and 2004), with both contracting by a cu-
mulative of 30% (BIS, 2006). 
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The reassessment of countries’ solvency by financial 
markets is an inevitable by-product of the current in-
crease in risk aversion and the »flight to safety« by glo-
bal investors. In the current uncertain environment, in-
vestors are shifting to bonds issued by the most credible 
issuers. This move is being facilitated by the significant 
increase in bond issuance by AAA rated governments, 
such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France 
and Germany. As a result, spreads on government bonds 
and credit defaults swaps of euro area countries such as 
Greece and Ireland, whose fiscal positions are consid-
ered particularly fragile, as well as CEE countries, have 
risen sharply. Concerns expressed by the markets in the 
latter case also include large external imbalances, large-
scale foreign borrowing by the private sector, and the 
widespread use of foreign-currency housing loans. In 
these circumstances, an additional fiscal stimulus could 
be perceived by the markets as an irresponsible policy, 
and lead to a vicious circle of further currency depreci-
ation leading to defaults on foreign currency borrowing 
and eventually resulting in a banking crisis. 
Effectiveness of fiscal stimulus plans. The effective-
ness of discretionary fiscal policy actions depends on 
the way the stimulus package is designed and announced 
to the public. Incoherent and unclear plans may lead to 
uncertainty among private agents, so the end effect may 
be detrimental rather than supportive to economic activ-
ity. In addition, discretionary fiscal actions usually take 
considerable time to get implemented, especially in the 
case of infrastructure projects. The stimulus might thus 
start at a time when the economy has already recovered, 
adding to the boom and risks of overheating.
The initial condition of public finances and the way the 
future costs of the stimulus are perceived by consumers 
and investors have a strong influence on the effective-
ness of the fiscal package. Private agents often rational-
ly expect a tightening of fiscal policy after the recession, 
knowing that the government will have to repay the ac-
cumulated debt and will either have to increase taxes or 
reduce public spending. Germany again provides a good 
example: after the fiscal expansion of the 1990s, which 
financed reunification, German households reduced their 
consumption sharply in the early 2000s, expecting a de-
cline in future pension and health care benefits. In other 
words, households may decide to save rather than spend 
the additional money received from a temporary boost 
to government spending. Empirical research shows that 
such behaviour, consistent with so-called Ricardian 
equivalence, is more likely to occur when the degree of 
»fiscal stress« represented by the level of government 
debt is relatively high. 
A discretionary fiscal stimulus is also associated with a 
number of political risks. As a result of political pres-
sures, stimulus funds are often channelled not to those 
sectors of the economy where they would provide the 
greatest benefit in terms of output and employment, but 
to the sectors such as infrastructure construction where 
the use of stimulus funds is highly visible by the media 
and hence of greatest value to the politicians, not to men-
tion special interest groups such as the construction 
lobby. 
To the extent that a country can finance fiscal expansion 
without a major increase in sustainability risk, the World 
Bank suggests focusing the incentives towards cushion-
ing the impact on the poor and vulnerable segments of 
the population. This policy could be implemented thro-
ugh a temporary increase (say, over a 12-month period) 
in social assistance spending on child allowances, unem-
ployment benefits and lowest pensions. These target gro-
ups have a high propensity to consume domestic goods, 
and would thus help support domestic production during 
the downturn (see World Bank, 2009).
The effectiveness of budgetary expansion in easing the 
recession also depends on the openness of the economy. 
Fiscal multipliers are usually lower in small and more 
open economies, where a relatively big part of the funds 
directed to the private agents are spent on imports rath-
er than locally produced goods and services (IMF, 2008). 
Croatia seems to fit this description rather well. 
Increased government borrowing in addition implies a 
crowding-out of the private sector from the domestic 
credit supply. Banks and other domestic investors often 
prefer to hold government bonds during recessions as a 
relatively safe and high-yielding asset. This in turn 
crowds out investment in private assets such as loans to 
enterprises and households. 
In summary, there are several important risks that should 
be taken into account when considering a fiscal stimu-
lus. The design, timing and the way the stimulus pack-
age is communicated to the markets have a crucial im-
pact on its effectiveness. The need for discretionary fis-
cal action also should be assessed against the initial con-
dition of public finances, the degree of openness of the 
economy, and the likely extent of crowding-out of the 
private sector. The risks of sustainability and effective-
ness seem highly relevant for Croatia at present. Giving 
in to populist pressures and embarking on fiscal expan-
sion in the current near-crisis environment would seri-
ously undermine macroeconomic and financial stabili-
ty and could push the economy deeper into crisis instead 
of helping it overcome the downturn.
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Appendix
Table A1  Growth of external loans vis-à-vis banks in central and eastern Europe  a
Changes in gross amounts outstanding at end-period
in million USD in % GDP
2006 2007 Q1 08 Q2 08 Q3 08 Q4 08 2006 2007 2008 
Czech Republic 1,631 5,966 3,872 338 -2,659 -3,094 1.1 3.4 -0.7
Hungary 5,142 7,425 4,763 3,301 -2,575 3,904 4.5 5.4 6.0
Poland 5,216 20,807 15,317 5,078 -4,768 -5,551 1.5 4.9 1.9
Slovakia -2,817 5,393 510 2,518 -1,267 572 -5.0 7.2 2.4
Slovenia 4,021 6,453 2,659 1,507 -2,293 -1,283 10.3 13.7 1.1
Estonia 2,093 4,873 1,644 385 -1,080 178 12.7 23.3 4.9
Latvia 4,972 6,227 2,516 429 -716 -379 24.9 21.6 5.4
Lithuania 3,242 5,423 697 1,141 458 278 10.8 13.9 5.4
Bulgaria 420 3,616 1,106 2,731 992 -369 1.3 9.1 8.6
Croatia 2,798 65 2,010 -620 -2,539 2,075 5.7 0.1 1.3
Romania 4,872 17,053 4,061 3,823 -538 500 4.0 10.1 3.9
Turkey 4,832 4,169 8,268 -4,404 7,037 -7,138 0.9 0.6 0.5
Albania -380 165 -121 -27 -25 -1 -4.2 1.5 -1.3
Bosnia and Herzegovina 442 844 180 407 -443 184 3.6 5.6 1.8
Macedonia 1 40 -10 6 -15 -39 0.0 0.5 -0.6
Serbia 2,486 -672 -43 112 -55 684 8.4 -1.7 1.4
Montenegro 53 528 108 114 19 19 2.0 13.7 5.4
a External loans of BIS reporting banks. 
Sources: BIS; IMF.
Table A2  Growth of external loans vis-à-vis the non-bank sector in central and eastern Europe  a
Changes in gross amounts outstanding at end-period
in million USD in % GDP
2006 2007 Q1 08 Q2 08 Q3 08 Q4 08 2006 2007 2008 
Czech Republic 3,465 3,514 2,325 1,076 -1,939 -72 2.4 2.0 0.6
Hungary 1,284 7,087 3,624 5,292 438 -622 1.1 5.1 5.6
Poland 6,242 6,432 4,405 1,960 -1,880 -1,573 1.8 1.5 0.6
Slovakia 915 2,391 1,053 267 801 -79 1.6 3.2 2.1
Slovenia 1,108 2,984 892 619 -540 592 2.8 6.3 2.9
Estonia 1,292 574 188 69 -364 -179 7.9 2.7 -1.2
Latvia 668 2,532 394 233 -368 -40 3.4 8.8 0.6
Lithuania 1,448 1,543 934 691 -703 -143 4.8 4.0 1.6
Bulgaria 2,786 2,188 1,600 1,147 -360 577 8.8 5.5 5.7
Croatia 2,794 6,569 2,293 1,439 -480 358 5.7 11.2 5.2
Romania 4,354 7,096 3,275 2,071 291 996 3.5 4.2 3.3
Turkey 16,229 22,058 7,306 6,842 192 -3,460 3.1 3.4 1.5
Albania -462 -19 16 191 22 296 -5.1 -0.2 4.0
Bosnia and Herzegovina -39 348 164 111 -62 -30 -0.3 2.3 1.0
Macedonia 37 98 61 27 35 21 0.6 1.2 1.5
Serbia 2,016 3,427 781 -193 120 -395 6.8 8.5 0.6
Montenegro 104 222 50 154 -2 16 3.9 5.8 4.5
a External loans of BIS reporting banks. 
Sources: BIS; IMF.
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